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Summary  findings
Cash prices for wheat in Poland are not closely related to  improving efficiency and price discovery in Poland. It
futures prices in Chicago and London, for several  would be difficult to develop, however, under present
reasons: differences in seasonality, fluctuations in  interventionist policies. This situation could be improved
exchange rate, poor dissemination of information in  by reducing the protection  of prices and by making any
Poland, and most important the Polish government's  intervention rules-based (reducing uncertainty about
intervention  in wheat markets.  policies).
Polish wheat prices generally move to expected  Should intervention  be reduced or rationalized, the
intervention  prices (set by ARR, the agency for  next question is whether  Poland needs its own wheat
agricultural markets) and then stay there until the next  futures exchange or whether Poland's private sector can
intervention level becomes known. The exception was in  use futures exchanges in London and Chicago to hedge
1994/95, when sharply higher world prices raised prices  against risk. The answer to that question is not an easy
in Poland.  one.
A wheat futures exchange in Poland could give the
private sector a tool for hedging against price risk,
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Since  1990 when Poland began to  introduce  free  market economy reforms, price volatility  of
agricultural conmmodities  has become a major source of risk for agribusiness firms. At the same
timne,  the Polish economy has been more open to international economic and trade linkages which
have led to greater observed price convergence between certain Polish and Western commodities.
Development of predictable price  relationships  might  create opportunities for  Polish firms  or
market institutions to use risk management tools  such as derivatives that are available in Western
markets.  However, effective use  of  such  risk  management  strategies depends heavily  on  the
existence of a fairly stable price relationship between considered markets. In this sense, establishing
whether a true economic relationship exists between Polish and Western prices is a fundamental
question when considering  the future development of Polish financial infrastructure.
In recent years  there has been  an  explosion in  the development of  new contracts on  existing
exchanges and the interest in developing new exchanges in emerging economies. By 1997, it has
been estimated that 18 developing countries will have active futures exchanges.' In addition to
interest  in  establishing local exchanges,  there  is  growing interest in  countries without  futures
markets to use established contracts on existing  Western exchanges. In 1991 the CFTC reported
2 that  more than 2100 traders from  96  countries  used  US  futures and  options markets.  In the
agricultural commodity area, countries that have a  strong price relationship between a particular
commodity  and the  corresponding futures  contract  use  existing contracts extensively for  risk
management purposes. A good example is the use of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) soybean
futures market by Argentine and Brazilian soybean exporters. The US, Brazil and Argentina all are
extensive participants in world soybean export markets. This creates a linkage between prices in the
three countries and this linkage creates hedging possibilities for South American exporters.
In the emerging markets of Central  Europe there has been a growing awareness and  increased
interest in the use of derivatives as a risk management tool. Western exchanges are participating in
this process and are contributing to the awareness and actual development of exchanges. 3 To date,
active exchanges have developed in  Hungary  and  Russia. Because of infrastructural problems,
however,  most  of  the contract liquidity  is  in  financial contracts, especially foreign exchange
contracts. With agricultural contracts, development is inhibited by the lack of support mechanisms
such as warehouse receipt systems and a reliable physical cash market that includes forward cash
contracts. In Poland there has been considerable interest in developing a futures market that would
trade both agricultural and financial futures contracts. With the support of the CBOT, a Warsaw
Commodity  Exchange  (WCE) has  been  established  with  the objective of  developing  futures
contracts in Poland. 4
The core issue for all countries or markets exploring the establishment of a new futures market is
whether or not local physical cash  markets have  a strong price relationship to  existing futures
'"Futures,  Futures  Everywhere".  Business Week,  April 8, 1996.
2 "Monthly Volume  Report".  Futures  Industry Organization,  December,  1991.
3 "Despite Skid,  Futures  Exchanges  Ready Emerging  Markets Push". Wall  Street  Journal",  January  17, 1995.
4 Grede, Frederick  J. "CBOT  to Assist  in the Creation  of Warsaw  Commodity  Exchange".
Financial Exchange, December, 1994.
4contracts. If a strong price correlation exists (as in the case of South American soybean prices and
CBOT futures) local interests might be best served by trading an existing contract (assuming one
exists). If a strong price correlation does not exist, the development of a contract based on local
needs might be the best way to satisfy local price risk management interests. For exarnple, the lack
of price correlation between Malaysian palm oil markets and the CBOT soyoil futures contract has
supported  the  development of  palm  oil  futures  on  the  Kuala  Lumpur Commodity Exchange
(KLCE).  Similarly, the establishment of an  exchange  that  would trade coffee futures is being
considered in Indonesia as local prices often are moving in divergence to prices traded in coffee
futures markets in New York and London.
The purpose of the study is to analyze relationships between Polish wheat cash prices and wheat
futures prices in selected international futures markets. Specifically, it was assumed to be relevant
to examine such relationships in reference to the wheat futures contracts traded at the CBOT and
London  International  Financial  Futures  Exchange  (LIFFE). 5 Establishing  whether  price
relationships exist will determine whether or not  viable price risk management programs can be
developed by Polish entities engaged in buying and selling wheat using existing futures contracts.
The answer to this question will have practical value to Polish businesses considering the use of
futures markets. Moreover, this analysis has policy implications with regard to whether or not a
futures exchange in Poland that has a wheat contract is needed. If the hypothesis is correct ( that
there is  a price correlation) it suggests that hedging  on  existing exchanges of Polish wheat is
possible.  This does not preclude development of a local Polish wheat futures contract. In fact, a
strong price correlation between Polish and world  prices could support a new contract through
arbitrage activities between markets. This is in fact the case in the US where the larger and much
more liquid CBOT contract is arbitraged against the Minneapolis Grain Exchange and Kansas City
Board of Trade contracts. In the near term, the main implication of a strong price correlation would
be that Polish entities could immediately begin risk management practices using existing futures
contracts.  If  the  hypothesis  is  negative  (no  correlation)  then  Poland  will  need to  consider
alternatives other than existing futures contracts in developing price risk management strategies. If
there is no price correlation, it will be important to establish what factors separate the Polish wheat
economy from other international prices.
1.1.  Wheat Price Series Selection
Within the US there are three exchanges that trade wheat futures contracts;  the Minneapolis Grain
Exchange (MGE), the Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBOT) and the CBOT. The MGE contract is
Hard Red Spring wheat, a high protein wheat primarily grown in the northern plains region of the
US.6 The KCBOT contract is based on Hard Red  Winter  Wheat primarily grown in the central
plains region. The CBOT contract is based on Soft Red  Winter Wheat 7 grown primarily in the
plains area east of the Mississippi River. Because  of  the high liquidity at the CBOT and the
5 In September 1996, LIFFE merged with the London Commodity Exchange (LCE) which was trading the wheat
futures contract.
6 The MGE also trades a Western White Wheat contract however this contract is relatively low volume.
7Hard  Red Spring Wheat and Hard Red Winter Wheat are also deliverable against the CBOT contract
at certain price differentials.
5delivery possibilities of other classes of wheat, the CBOT contract is considered more reflective of
global wheat conditions. In addition, the class of wheat traded at the CBOT most closely resembles
the type of wheat grown in Poland. For these reasons, the CBOT contract was chosen as the price to
be used in this analysis. Outside the US, the most liquid wheat futures contract is the LIFFE wheat
futures.  This futures contract was also included in the analysis.8
The  analysis  was carried out  over  a  period of  6  years,  i.e., from  1990 to  1995. This  period
represents the time during which Poland experienced a liberalized economic structure. Despite the
beginnings  of a free market system, finding a representative price series in Poland to compare
against futures prices is somewhat problematic. While several grain exchanges exist where physical
cash wheat is traded, the volume of trade is erratic and quoted prices might not be representative of
the  overall  market.  In  addition, most  of  these  exchanges were  created only recently, thereby
limiting the time frame available for analysis. The Polish price series chosen for the analysis was
average monthly wheat prices for Poland as reported by the Central Statistical Office (GUS). This
price represents prices paid to farmers by commercial enterprises. Price analysis was conducted on
both a calendar year and crop year (August-September) basis as both have some merit in terms of
looking at impacts of various factors.
2.  Wheat Price Variation  in Poland  in Years 1990-95
The first analytical task chosen was to gain insight into the price variation in Poland with respect to
variation over time and spatially within Poland. The primary objective of examining variation over
time was to gain insight into the degree of Polish price volatility. The basic methodology used was
to quantify the spread of minimum and maximum prices and the coefficient of variation (standard
deviation divided by average prices for each year).
The purpose of the spatial variation analysis was to determine if prices within Poland showed any
significant variation between regions. This has implications from a risk management standpoint as
large variations  between regions would  suggest that  there  are variations  in the basis risk that
individual firms might encounter. Measuring the spatial variation in prices also gives insight into
the level  of integration of the Polish  wheat market. If the market is operating efficiently, there
should be a relatively stable price relationship between regions in Poland. The general method of
looking  at  spatial  variation was  to  observe  minimum  and  maximum  prices for  each  month
throughout the 49 voivodships of Poland and to create a ratio of maximum versus minimum prices.
2.1.  Variation  over Time
As  is shown in Table 1, there is a great deal of variation observed over time in wheat prices in
Poland. Prices tend to be very volatile especially in years of shortages when supply of wheat is
considerably lower compared with average years. As can be seen in the Polish wheat balance table
in Table 3, the 1992/93 and 1994/95 production years were characterized by low production due to
drought and low ending inventories. These years correspond to greater than normal price volatility.
" As noted later in  the paper,  LIFFE wheat futures  contract prices are influenced  by the EU's agricultural  policies
(CAP) for grains.
6When compared with prices on the CBOT and the LIFFE, Polish wheat prices exhibited strong
changes in variation from year to year. For example, during the time period covered, price variation
as  measured  by the  coefficient of  variation ranged from  4.2% to  27.7%  in Poland while the
coefficient of variation over the same period of time on the CBOT was 8.0% to 15.1%.
This price variability over time represents great price risk for those who operate on the Polish wheat
market.  It also  indicates a need for using  effective risk management tools. Clearly under such
conditions  alternatives such as  hedging with  derivatives that  are already available in  Western
markets should be examined.
2.2.  Spatial Variation
Figures  in  Table  2  show  that  based  on  measures  of  spatial  variation of  the  wheat  prices,
considerable differences between voivodships  can  be  observed. The main  observations are as
follows:
a)  Price  differentiation among the  49  voivodships  is  very high.  This can  only partly  be
explained by the cost of grain transportation which within Poland usually does not exceed
roughly 8% to 10%9 of the total value of the grain transported. The measured difference
between the lowest and highest price for any one month is very often over 20% and in fact,
the overall average price differential for the 1990-1995 period is 40%. This level of price
difference would indicate that prices within Poland are not integrated to the degree that
normal efficiencies would suggest.
b)  Large  differences  in  price  levels  could  especially  be  observed  in  1990.  This  is
understandable as it was the first  year of free market economy reforms in Poland, and
different markets which started to develop showed very little stability.
c)  During the whole period of analysis, 1990-95, the spatial variation of the wheat prices has
been declining, although, it still remains very high. This declining trend might imply that
there are some improvements in the market efficiency, but this process is not progressing
well enough to assure for a quick spatial price adjustments.
d)  Price levels in certain months differ much more than in some others; generally prices in
winter months as well just  before harvest time are more volatile than during and after the
harvest time. There are, however, some exceptions depending on the particular year.
3.  Basis Risk Analysis
Basis risk analysis refers to the risk associated with price risk management practices whereby a firm
will hedge the physical cash price risk in a derivative futures market. For example, a firm that has
purchased physical cash wheat will sell an equal and offsetting amount of futures contracts in an
established futures exchange. This enables a firm to protect itself from potential price declines. If
there is a strong price relationship between the physical cash market and the futures market, price
changes in the physical cash market will be reflected in the futures market. In essence, the firm has
shifted its risk of declining prices to the futures market (of course, the firm has also foregone the
opportunity to benefit from price increases). This risk shifting process is one of the primary values
9 Based on interviews with industry participants and transportation firms.of  a  futures market.  Of course, not  all of  the  risk  can be  shifted as there is never a perfect
relationship between cash and futures markets. There is always some residual risk associated with
the hedging process. This residual risk (the price risk that can not be shifted to futures markets) is
commonly referred to as the basis risk. Put another way, the basis risk is the price variation in the
physical cash market that can not be explained by futures price variation.  A low level of variation in
the basis implies that there is a strong price relationship between cash and futures markets and
viable risk management strategies can be devised. A high level of basis variation indicates that the
relationship between the physical cash  market and the futures market is not strong and that not
enough risk can be shifted to make the hedging operation worthwhile. This section examines the
basis relationship between Polish wheat prices and prices of wheat on the CBOT and LIFFE.
3.1.  Relationships  between  Polish  Wheat  Cash  Prices  and  CBOT  and  LIFFE  Wheat
Futures Prices
Ordinary least square regression was used to assess the correlation between cash prices in Poland
and the corresponding futures prices on the CBOT and the LIFFE.  The equation used is of the
following form:
s(t) = a + b* f(t)
where: s(t) is the cash price for wheat in Poland at time t, and f(t) is the futures price for wheat in
CBOT or LIFFE at time t.  We used  three  forms of  the variables.  First, the variables were
expressed in levels.  Second, the variables were deseasonalized to assess the impact of seasonality
on the relationship between futures and cash prices.  The deseasonalized prices were created by
regressing  each of the prices on  twelve  monthly  dummies plus  a time trend.  The estimated
residuals from that regression are the deseasonalized prices. Third, the variables were differenced.
The adcdusted  R squared can be viewed as one way of measuring the residual risk inherent in the
basis.  That is, the adjusted R squared indicates the percentage of the variability in cash prices that
is not explained by the futures prices.  The percentage of the cash price changes that is unexplained
(1-R squared) is an estimate of the basis risk.  The higher the unexplained  variability, the lower the
value of the adjusted R squared (the higher the basis risk), and the lower the usefulness of the
particular wheat futures contract in hedging Polish wheat cash price risks.
The estimation of the R squared using the regression analysis described above was performed for
the overall period 1990 to  1995 and for each individual year.  R squares were computed for both
calendar and crop years.
3.1.1. Correlation of Prices in US Dollar Terms
Polish and LIFFE wheat prices were converted to US dollar equivalent prices. In addition to the
correlations with prices in levels, the impact of  seasonality on prices was assessed by using a
deseasonalized data series as well as the first differences of the respective price series. Correlations
See Labuszewski  and Nyhoff(1988),  and Smith, Smithson  and Wilford  (1989).
8were for the full period, 1990-95, and for each individual year.  Table 4 shows the result of Polish
wheat prices against CBOT and LIFFE wheat prices. The results were most promising for the
deseasonalized prices in 1993 (especially for the LIFFE prices) and for the 1993/94, 1994/1995
marketing years. While these results are more promising than the previous correlations,  the results
are still very inconsistent from one year to the next.
In general, there was poor correlation arnong the price series examined in this section. This could
be explained by:
a)  International and Polish wheat prices have increased over the past two years, generally rising
above government support levels.
b)  In the  1994/95 crop year Poland was  a significant importer of wheat. This activity would
create greater links between the Polish wheat market and international  wheat markets.
c)  Due to budgetary constraints, the ARR was less active in interventions in the Polish wheat
market  during the  1994 harvest.  This  apparently  enabled Polish prices to  better  reflect
conditions in the open market.
More data available only with the passage of time will be needed in order to asses whether this
stronger positive correlation can be sustained.
3.1.2. Correlation of the Lagged Prices in US Dollar Terms
Tables 5 and 6 show the results of correlations of Polish wheat prices in US dollar terms lagged
against CBOT and LIFFE (US dollar terms) prices. The lagging process improves the correlation
results for CBOT futures prices, especially  when prices  are lagged three or four months. This
suggests that there could be inefficiencies related to the transmission of information to the Polish
grain markets. In other words, it takes up to three or four months for factors readily apparent to
those trading at the CBOT to be fully discounted into the Polish wheat market. Lagging Polish
wheat prices against LIFFE prices did not improve the correlation results.
3.1.3. Cointegration analysis of Polish and CBOT and LIFFE prices
Cointegration analysis indicates whether there is a stable long-term relationship between two (or
more) price series.  Thus, prices can show  short-run deviations, but in the long-run they move
together.  We tested for pairwise cointegration between the Polish and CBOT prices and between
the Polish and LIFFE prices. The test used is the ADF test and its results are shown below."
Polish-CBOT  Polish-LIFFE
Nominal Prices  -2.71  -2.23
Deseasonalized Prices  -2.65  -2.21
The ADF statistics are calculated for the period 1990 to 1995 using monthly data, for a total of 72
observations.  The ADF statistics are below the 90% critical level (-2.84) thus the hypothesis of
cointegration is rejected.  This means that according to  the ADF test and for the period tested,
"'  ADF is theAugmnented  Dickey Fuller test (see Dickey and Fuller, 1979).
9Polish  and CBOT and Polish and LIFFE prices do not move together in the long-run.  In other
words, there is not a stable long-run relationship between the wheat price pairs tested.'2
4.  Assessment of the Price Basis over Time
After examining the numerical correlations in the previous section, it is worthwhile  to take a more
graphical look at the relationship between Polish wheat prices and wheat prices on the CBOT and
the LIFFE. In Graph 1, the prices of Polish, CBOT  and LIFFE wheat prices in dollar terrns are
shown as a time series. The graph shows in a visual fashion what the correlation  statistics implied:
that is that there appears to be a convergence in the price of Polish wheat with international wheat
prices beginning somewhere in mid to late 1994.
As noted earlier, when engaged in hedging activities, a commercial firmn  thinks in terms of residual
risk or more commonly a basis risk. This risk is the fluctuation of the price differential between
cash and futures prices, also known as the basis, and can be described by the simple formula:
physical cash price -futures  price = basis; and
basis risk =fluctuation  of the basis
In the case of our analysis the physical cash price is the Polish wheat price and the futures price is
either the CBOT or the LIFFE price. A graphical display of these relationships is shown in graph 2.
This  graph shows visually the strong basis risk of the Polish wheat basis using both CBOT and
LIFFE futures prices as a base. It can also be seen, however, that the magnitude of the variation
appears to be declining during the last two years of the time series (see Tables 7 and 8). As with the
correlation analysis, this suggests that some price  convergence is occurring in recent marketing
years.
5.  Discussion of the Primary Reasons for Lack of a Stable Basis
The analysis contained in this report suggests that while the correlation between Polish and LIFFE
and  CBOT wheat prices might be  improving, there is still a  considerable amount of basis risk
inherent in these relationships. As a result, commercial firms in Poland that operate in physical cash
wheat markets are not likely able to utilize existing futures markets as a price risk management tool.
This  puts Polish firms at a disadvantage vis-a-vis  their Western counterparts who regularly use
futures markets to manage their price risk. Lack of effective price risk management  tools are likely
to increase the cost of (higher interest rates) or restricts access to working capital loans due to the
increased risk profile of the firms. In addition, market activities are somewhat restricted for these
firms as accumulating inventories and making forward sales might place the firm in a position of
taking on untenable price risk. Ultimately the producer will bear much of the cost of this lack of
price risk management as prices in this type of environment tend to be more volatile and the price
12  It shou]d  be noted  that  the sample  size  maybe  small  for the ADF test to have  adequate  power.
10spread between producer and consumer will be greater than if price risk management instruments
were available.
For the benefit of the entire economy it is desirable to  look at ways to improve the price risk
management  environment. In order to  do this,  the factors leading to poor correlation of Polish
wheat prices versus CBOT and LIFFE prices must be identified. The analysis conducted in this
study suggested several factors that are summarized below:
5.1.  Currency Exchange Rate Risk
If Polish processors, traders, and farmers use wheat futures contracts at CBOT or LIFFE they are
exposed to exchange rate fluctuations as they need to hedge wheat cash prices denominated in local
currency (zloty) using futures contracts denominated in US  dollars or British pounds. Generally,
this  exchange  rate has been increasing  (depreciating) over the period  analyzed with  variations
within a particular year (see table 9). Unless Polish firms are able to use a derivative instrument
denominated in local currency, they will need to manage an exchange rate risk when dealing with
Western futures markets.1 3
5.2.  Market Inefficiencies
The spatial and lagged analysis sections indicated that there were inefficiencies in the Polish market
that led to price differences within Poland and poor correlation between Polish prices and those of
the CBOT and LIFFE. It is not hard to understand why there would be inefficiencies  within Poland
related to poor access to infornation.  The typical firm in Western economies has access to a broad
array  of  both  public  and  private  information  sources.  These  sources  are  available  almost
instantaneously to market participants via electronic services such as quote machines, faxes, e-mail
etc.  Generally the technology is available in  Poland.  What is lacking are information products
tailored to the Polish market and an understanding on the part of market participants regarding the
use of information. It is also worth noting that the existence of futures markets in Western countries
has provided much of the incentive for the development and use of market information. As this
information is widely disseminated, it benefits all participants and not just those directly involved
in futures market operations.
5.3.  Seasonality Differences
Under normal market conditions a seasonal wheat price pattern should be observed that reflects
costs of storage and handling from the harvest period forward. In the case of Polish wheat prices,
seasonal price movement is different in each year observed. In addition, only the year 1994/95
reflects what could be considered a normal seasonal pattern of price movement. In the balance of
the years certain deviations from the expected seasonal pattern can be observed. These deviations
are especially apparent in  1991/92 and  1993/94. Comparing these years with ARR wheat market
13  In an integrated world wheat market, the existence of a Polish wheat futures contract could create arbitrage
operations between Polish and US or UK wheat futures contracts to hedge currency risks.
IIinvolvement in particular years leads to the conclusion that higher intervention levels, as they were
in these years, could result in major distortions of expected seasonal wheat price patterns.
5.4.  Policies of Western Governments
Both the US and EU have extensive agricultural policy activities that could have a distorting impact
on wheat prices in their respective countries. In the case of the US, since 1985 an export subsidy
called  the Export Enhancement Program  was applied  to US  wheat exports. The intent  of this
subsidy was to enable US wheat producers to compete with export subsidies from other countries,
especially those from the EU. One possible  impact of these subsidies was to create an artificial
price difference between export markets and US wheat futures markets. In effect, during the time
these subsidies were in place the US wheat futures market was likely less representative of global
supply demand conditions than would normally be the case. Table 10 shows monthly average EEP
subsidies from  1989 up to the present. As  can be  seen, EEP subsidies were particularly heavy
during late 1991 and early 1992 and  1993. In early 1994 and 1995 the level of subsidy began to
decline and the program was eventually discontinued in mid 1995 due to extremely low US and
world wheat supplies. This period of decline coincides with at least a slight improvement in the
correlation between CBOT and Polish wheat prices suggesting that these subsidies likely played
some role in the poor price relationships experienced in the early 1990's.
With regard to  EU policies that might  impact LIFFE  wheat prices, the EU operates an export
restitution program enabling it to maintain relatively high internal wheat prices while at the same
time exporting surpluses into the world market. The impact on domestic EU prices (as reflected on
the LIFFE wheat futures) is similar to the impact of the US EEP program: futures prices that are
somewhat detached from world prices. It should be noted that in 1995 due to impending EU and
world shortages (similar to the US situation) export restitutions were discontinued. In fact, late in
1995 licenses were not being issued for grain exports and eventually a tax was placed on the export
of wheat and other grains.
It is clear that agricultural policies in the US and the EU are likely to have some impact on price
correlations between futures markets in these economies and wheat prices in Poland. But as has
also been noted, for now some of the prime distorting factors, at least in the US have been removed
(the export tax on EU grain could have the continued effect of isolating prices in that region from
other  world  prices). To  asses how  positive  these  developments will  be  with  regard to  price
relationships between Poland and the West, the agricultural policies within Poland must also be
examined.
5.5.  Polish Government Intervention Policies
The  Agency  for  Agricultural Markets  (the  Polish  acronym  is  ARR)  is  one  of  the  primary
government agencies charged with implementing government agricultural policy in Poland. ARR
was established in  1990 with the purpose of stabilizing agricultural markets as a way to protect
farmers' incomes. The ARR's objective is to conduct intervention purchases when the supplies are
high, so as to absorb market surpluses, and to  sell these accommodated stocks in the periods of
1  2relative  market  deficits.  Also,  ARR  is  responsible  for  maintaining  state reserves  of  certain
agricultural commodities.
ARR purchasing activities are financed by the government within a budget approved on a yearly
basis.  14 Its activities focus on grains, meat and  milk markets. The activities of this agency are
relatively  extensive in  several commodities,  one  of which  is wheat. In 1992 a minimum price
system was introduced. The price serves a reference point to define intervention price at which
intervention purchases are made to defend the  minimum price level. Intervention purchases  are
conducted in three ways: (1) direct purchases,  (2) purchases through authorized warehouses (3)
indirect intervention through commodity  loans  to  larger  farms. It  is  believed that  "effective"
intervention can take place when the level of grain stocks accumulated by ARR reaches 0.7 - 1.0
million. Graph 3 shows the ARR's intervention price levels and wheat cash prices in Poland.
In addition  to  the minimum price  set  by  ARR,  the  Polish  government uses import tariffs to
discourage imports of "cheaper" wheat into the  Polish  market.  Imports at international prices
would undernine  efforts to set domestic minimum prices.
The next section is a general description  of the  ARR's  activities as they relate to Polish wheat
markets. The section that follows is an interpretation of the impact of these policies on Polish wheat
prices based on the analysis contained in this study.
5.5.1. Mechanics of ARR Policies
With regard to wheat, one of the primary  objectives of the ARR is to protect a minimum wheat
price through direct intervention activities (purchases) in the wheat market. The minimum wheat
price is set by the govemment. The minimum price that goes into effect in August of a particular
crop year is typically announced during the proceeding March. In order to keep prices from falling
below this minimum price, the ARR is allowed to pay an intervention price that can be up to 20 %
higher than the minimum price. Historical intervention levels are shown in Table 3. In addition to
these price support activities, the ARR also purchases  wheat on behalf of the government for a
strategic reserve. Besides direct purchases at the intervention price, the ARR might also accumulate
stocks from producers who deliver grain at a facility and are not able to sell grain at a price higher
than the minimum price. In these cases the ARR is in effect a market of last resort for producers.
By  looking at total wheat procurements  in Poland  (in this terminology procurements represent
wheat purchased by commercial entities and the government through the ARR) and the percentage
of ARR purchases of the total crop, the percentage of wheat purchased by the ARR that reaches
commercial channels can be calculated. This is shown in Table 3. As is shown, the percentage of
ARR purchases of total procurements has been increasing over time.
14  Through  its activities,  ARR  has also built-up  significant  resources  independently  of the yearly  budget  transfers  it
receives. These amounts  are not  published  and some elements  sush as expenses  to replenish  the strategic  reserves
remain  strictly  confidential.
I 35.5.2. Impact of ARR Policies
When looking at ARR policies, it is helpful to view the intervention prices within the context of
market prices in Poland. Graph 3 shows nominal Polish wheat prices and ARR intervention prices.
As can be seen, there has been a dramatic increase in the level of both of these prices over the past
four  years.  A  hard  question to  answer  is  whether  Polish  market  prices are following ARR
intervention prices or whether the reverse is the case. It should be kept in mind that minimum prices
(on  which  intervention  prices  are  based)  are  announced  in  the  March  prior  to  August
implementation.  It  is  almost  certainly  true  that  the  market  will  react  upward and  seek  an
intervention price that is higher than current market prices.
With the exception of the announcement of minimum and intervention prices, the activities of the
ARR are generally not disclosed  to the market place. This doubtless contributes to uncertainty with
regard to price expectations. Moreover, activities of the ARR are so large that market participants
contacted  within the course of  preparing this  report  expressed  the opinion that ARR market
activities were the prime driving force behind wheat  price movements in Poland. This opinion
seems to be  supported by the pattern of price behavior  relative to intervention prices shown in
Graph 3.
Over the time period examined in this study ARR intervention activities were so prevalent in each
year that it was not possible to measure the impact of intervention activities in any one year. Even
the ARR recognizes that it is perceived as a  "mega-institution"  with regard to perceptions of its
activities in the market place 15. It is interesting to note that the year of heaviest ARR intervention
activities,  1994/95, was a year in which Polish grain prices showed a high correlation with CBOT
and  LIFFE prices on a deseasonalized basis. During this  year global grain prices began a rapid
escalation that culminated in near record prices in  1996. It can be said that market prices overran
intervention prices and under these conditions Polish prices became linked to those on the CBOT
and LIFFE. If world prices decline back to intervention levels, Polish wheat prices will once again
be primarily influenced by ARR intervention activities.
5.5.3. ARR Policy Objectives and Methods
While current ARR policies are a primary distortion to the wheat market in Poland, it must be kept
in mind that the objectives of the ARR are similar to analogous government organizations in other
countries.  For example, the Commodity  Credit  Corporation  (CCC) in the United States has
historically undertaken intervention activities in the market place using the loan rate mechanism as
the intervention tool.  For example, loan rates  for various  commodities are established by the
United States Department of Agriculture.  These loans are known as "non-recourse loans" in that
the farmer pledges the commodity as collateral.  After a nine month period, the farmer can either
repay the loan (plus interest) or forfeit the commodity to the CCC.  Obviously if market prices
'5  "Docewiadczenia  i perspektywy  dzia3alnoceci  Agencji Rynku Rolnego (Experiences  and prospects for ARR
activities)",  Konferencja  n/t:  Interwencjonizmn  Na  Rynku  Rolnym-Docewiadczenia  i  Perspektywy
(Conference:  Intervention  in  the  Agricultural  Markets-Experiences  and  Perspectives),Pu3tusk,  Poland,
October 3-5, 1995.
14available to the farmer are not enough to repay the loan plus interest, the farmer turns the loan over
to the CCC.  Obviously, the loan levels act as a "floor" for prices as the government will take
ownership of the commodity at these levels.
The US experience in implementing wheat price support activity in the past has not been dissimilar
to  Poland's  current experience.  For example, from roughly 1975 to  1984 wheat loan levels (in
effect  price  support  levels) steadily  increased.  With  wheat prices  supported by  strong export
demand during the latter half of the 1970's, high loan rates had little impact on wheat market prices.
By the 1980's, however, competition in export markets intensified and the high US support prices
became a severe hindrance to US exports and generally to price discovery within the US.  During
the  early  1980's, US  wheat exports declined while  inventories held by the CCC increased to
burdensome levels.  Not until government policy changed in  1985-1986 when lower loan rates
were instituted did US wheat export recover and government held stocks decline.  The prevailing
policy in the US is to keep loan rates at "safety net" levels and let market price float to levels where
they are able to attract or ration demand.
5.5.4. Policy Lessons Learned
The experience in both the US and Poland suggests some factors critical to effective agricultural
policy implementation'6. Some of these factors can be summarized as follows:
1)  Although no government intervention is the preferred policy scenario, it is understood that
governments for political reasons feel that they need to provide some price support in certain
agricultural sectors.  It is important to note that several developed and developing economies
have been providing a safety net to  producers  of certain commodities.  In this  sense, the
overall concept behind the ARR activities is not by itself the main distorting factor.  Several
countries have similar structures.  It  is  the method and  level that creates distortions and
impedes markets to function properly.
2)  If intervention activities are deemed necessary, they should provide a "safety net" and not
distort the market.  It  follows from point  1) above that it is the level of support that is
significant and to a lesser extent the mechanism itself that is critical.  In the case of the US in
the early 1980's and Poland since 1989, the price support levels were too high and market
prices were distorted.  Also, intervention in the EU's wheat market has been one of the key
reasons as to why there was not a well developed European wheat futures contract.
3)  Intervention activities need to be predictable.  Markets do not like uncertainty, especially if
there is one entity such as the ARR that has such an enormous impact that all sectors will be
effected by  its  activities.  Interventions  on  the part  of  government agencies must  have
parameters  that  everyone  in  the  market  understands  and  can  plan  around.  If  market
participants operate in an environment that is unpredictable from a policy standpoint, free
market activity comes to a virtual halt.
16 Because  the US is most similar  to the Polish  experience  in the use of floor prices, it was used as an example. It
must be pointed out that he EU is undergoing  a similar  metamorphasis  in its agricultural  policy  as its recourses  that
high support  prices in the form of "intervention  prices"  are very costly and result in severe  price  distortions.
155.5.5 Is Price Support Crucial for Agricultural Development in Poland?
In several counties in transition, including Poland, farmers tend to believe, and policy makers to
accept, that higher price support is in itself an answer to farmers' problems.  This is a problem
because it tends to divert attention  and public funds away from making necessary changes in
factors that are essential to improving the productivity and prosperity of agriculture in these
countries.  According to Gardner (1996), the experience of economies in transition to date has
shown that what happens in agriculture crucially depends on matters other than price support.
For example, macroeconomic policies affecting inflation, real interest rates, exchange rates, trade
policies, the economic organization of farming and land ownership, the input supply situation
and structure, credit availability and costs,  and constraints upon the domestic marketing of
agricultural commodities.
In Poland, for example, existing efforts to develop commodity markets, whether wholesale
markets, cash commodity exchanges and/or futures markets, and the development of a warehouse
receipt system will likely contribute to the reduction of marketing margins, improve competition,
and mobilize credit to the agricultural sector.  However, the effectiveness of several of these
efforts will crucially depend on the level and predictability of the price support policy.  For
example, high levels of price support and unpredictability in setting price support levels remove
the incentive to hedge and inhibit the development of a futures exchange. High, panseasonal and
panterritorial prices remove incentives to store commodities and  undermine efforts to develop a
warehouse receipt system.
Government policies can still support prices.  However, price support policies need to be
modified as to provide a safety net to farmers.  That means that the level of price support needs
to be such that market prices will clear above the price support level most of the times.  Also,
government policies need to be predictable and anticipated by market participants.  Uncertainty
related to government pricing policies, including price support levels, will likely increase
marketing margins as traders need a "cushion" to protect their profit margins from unanticipated
changes in pricing policies.  Uncertainty related to government policies also undermines the
development of local futures markets for agricultural commodities, such as wheat.
5.5.6 Price Support and Future EU Accession
Although Polish price support levels for wheat are above world market levels, they are still
below those levels in the EU.  Harmonization of Polish wheat prices with those prevailing now in
the EU will require an increase in price support.  However, several studies have estimated that
the cost to the government budget and to the Polish economy, as a whole, will increase
significantly if Poland harmonizes its price support level to the current CAP levels (see
Tangermann, 1996 and Orlowski, 1996).  In addition, there are indications that by the time of the
Polish accession, the EU will likely continue reducing its cereal support price level and increase
emphasis on market non-distorting support, such as direct payments decoupled from production
and hectarage. This, along with the suppression of export subsidies for cereals, will likely
increase the correlation between European wheat prices and world wheat prices. Already, the
,  Ireduction in EU price support has increased interest in the development of futures contracts for
agricultural commodities. and in particular wheat.  LIFFE in England, MATIF in France, and
the new commodity exchange in Hannover,  Germany, all aspire to develop a European wheat
futures contract.  So far, these efforts have not developed fully because there is still a level of
wheat price support in the EU that, presently, reduces the incentives to hedge wheat price risks
and thus inhibits the development of a European wheat futures contracts.
Assuming that price support for wheat is reduced in both Poland and EU and Polish and EU
wheat prices not only move closely together but also closely to world market prices, such as the
CBOT wheat futures price, is there a need to develop a wheat futures contract in Poland?  For
example, if there is a liquid forward or futures contract for the zloty-dollar or zloty-British pound
exchange rate, market participants could use the CBOT or LIFFE wheat futures contract to hedge
their zloty denominated wheat cash prices.  However, even if the correlation between Polish and
European, US prices increases, it could still be the case where existing or newly developed
European wheat futures contracts leave a basis risk. enough to justify the development of a
Polish wheat futures contract.  At present it is very difficult to determnine  whether there is a need
for a Polish wheat futures contract as both Polish and EU price support policies for wheat are
likely to evolve.  The evolution of pricing policies will determine how closely Polish and EU
wheat prices move together and also move closely to world prices.
6.  Conclusions and Discussion
This  study found that over the period covered,  Polish wheat prices were generally unrelated to
wheat futures prices on CBOT and LIFFE exchanges. Differences in seasonal price patterns seemed
to play a role in the lack of correlation. Exchange  rate fluctuations seemed also to be a  factor,
especially with regard to comparisons with LIFFE prices. Poor information dissemination within
the Polish wheat market is an additional factor leading to poor price correlations as indicated by the
improvement in results when looking at lagged prices. The greatest price distortions, however, can
be attributed to extensive ARR market intervention activities. During the years examined, the ARR
on average purchased an estimated 25% of the wheat that moved in commercial channels. Local
Polish wheat prices generally moved to expected ARR intervention prices and stayed there until the
next intervention level became known. The exception to this was the 1994/95 year when global and
Polish wheat prices moved sharply higher in response to historically low wheat stock levels.
Under this market environment, it is not anticipated that hedging activities on the CBOT or the
LIFFE would be viable risk management practices. The basis risk is extremely high for most years
and generally can not be explained by normal market factors. While the results from 1994/95 are
encouraging, it must be recognized that they are likely the result of high world prices that enabled
Polish wheat prices to rise well above established intervention prices. While a hedging program in
this enviromnent might be temporarily effective, it must be recognized that once prices fall back to
intervention levels, the price relationship will once again break down.
17  Following the 1992 reforms of the CAP, the intervention price for wheat was reduced by one third.
l;Given that Polish market participants do not have the option to manage risk on existing exchanges,
the next question is: would the development of a wheat futures contract in Poland (or one based on
the Polish wheat market) enhance price risk management opportunities for the Polish sector? If the
lack  of correlation were simply a  matter of  seasonal,  currency and information dissemination
factors this  idea might have merit. In fact, it could be  argued that the development of a wheat
futures  contract  would  greatly  enhance  market  efficiency  and  price  discovery  in  Poland.
Unfortunately,  the primary price distortion factor  appears to be the intervention policies of the
ARR. In particular, the high level of price protection offered by ARR's intervention prices. Under
these conditions, it would be difficult to develop a Polish based futures contract as a futures market
would have as much difficulty establishing market value for wheat as the physical market currently
has.
Certain changes in Polish wheat price intervention policies could greatly assist in the development
of physical and futures markets for wheat in Poland.  These changes need to have the following
two features. First, price protection needs to be such as to allow market prices to clear above the
intervention prices for most of the times.  That is, intervention policies need to provide a safety net
that is low enough to let market prices reflect supply and demand conditions and allow them to
reflect  market  seasonalitv.  The latter  will encourage  the development of a  profitable storage
industry  and  contribute to  the privatization  of  grain  storage in  Poland.  Second, the  rules  of
intervention  have  to  be  well  known  and  anticipated  by  market  participants.  For  example,
intervention prices  could be  linked  to  some  kind  of  a  discounted moving average of  border
(international) prices.  Discounting will ensure  that  market prices clear above the intervention
prices.  If intervention is unanticipated, market  participants  will likely not use futures markets
because of the uncertainty of government (or ARR) actions.
Another important element for the development of physical and futures markets in Poland is the
development of a warehouse receipt system for grains.  A pilot project has already started financed
by USAID with VOCA the executing agency.  The development of a warehouse receipt system will
have the following benefits in terms of market development.  First, warehouse receipts contribute in
improving the efficiency of grain trading, and  provide  for  a mechanism for physical delivery
against futures contracts.  That is, if futures contracts are not closed prior to expiration, physical
delivery  takes place (this is necessary to keep physical  or spot prices closely linked to futures
prices).  The mechanism for the physical delivery is usually (in most grain exchanges worldwide)
the warehouse receipt system.  Second, a warehouse receipt system can be used by ARR to carry-
out its intervention without participating in the physical (  spot) market.  Simply, ARR will set the
intervention price and if market prices fall below this intervention price, farmers  or traders will give
their warehouse receipts to ARR.  By doing this, the cost of market intervention will be reduced
and will contribute to market efficiency.  The private  sector will be responsible for storage of
grains.  ARR's  inventories will be handled by  the private sector and they will be acquired and
released based on the pre-announced rules of intervention.  The type of intervention  and the use of
warehouse receipts as described above are not only found in the US, but now also in the EU.  Other
Eastern European countries are considering and preparing to applN  such systems. Among them are
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia. and Turkey.With changes in the level and method of intervention in the Polish wheat market, it is likely that
Polish cash wheat prices will move closer to wheat futures prices in Chicago and London.  If this is
the case, is there any  need to develop a wheat  futures  contract in Poland?  The answer is not
obvious.  Even with the policy changes described  above  the correlation between Polish wheat
prices and wheat futures prices in Chicago and London may still not be high enough. This could be
due, for example, to seasonality, fluctuations in the foreign exchange, dissemination  of information,
and contract specifications (including quality specifications and delivery locations). Thus, a Polish
wheat  futures contract could provide a closer correlation with  cash prices than a foreign based
contract and hence could attract liquidity (sufficient numnber  of trades).  It is likely that the trade-off
between a Polish wheat futures contract and existing futures contracts in Chicago and London will
be basis (higher correlation with cash prices) versus liquidity.  A Polish futures contract will likely
be more correlated with cash prices but existing futures contracts in Chicago and London will have
higher  liquidity.  Traders might also  use existing  wheat contracts  in Chicago and London to
arbitrage a Polish wheat futures contract. It should be noted that worldwide there can be more than
one  futures contract for a commodity.  In the United States alone there are three wheat futures
contracts that co-exist.
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22Table 1: Variation over time of monthly nominal  wheat prices in Poland
Time Period  Variation Measures
Min  Max  Spread  Average  Standard  Coefficient of Variation [%]
Max-Min  Deviation  Poland  CBOT  LIFFE
Calendar Years:
1990  73.1  88.3  15.2  79.0  4.1  5.2  15.1  na
1991  76.0  88.2  12.2  83.0  3.5  4.2  13.5  na
1992  94.0  210.9  116.9  150.5  41.6  27.7  8.6  5.3
1993  233.1  264.9  31.8  248.7  10.6  4.3  9.1  16.2
1994  230.1  330.9  100.8  258.9  27.2  10.5  8.0  4.3
1995  329.7  426.9  97.2  365.7  25.8  7.0  13.6  5.4
Production Years:
1990/91  77.8  88.2  10.4  82.5  3.4  4.1  4.5  na
1991/92  76.0  170.6  94.6  103.4  27.6  26.7  9.7  4.1
1992/93  178.0  264.9  86.9  230.2  32.3  14.0  8.9  9.6
1993/94  230.1  276.0  45.9  245.2  12.4  5.0  6.5  5.4
1994/95  230.4  380.6  150.2  323.0  51.3  15.9  7.3  6.4Table 2:  Spatial variation of nominal monthly  wheat prices in Poland
(based on the monthly  prices for 49 voivodships)
Month  Average price for Poland  Max/Min Relationship
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  Average
JAN  83.6  85.6  94.0  245.6  242.6  363.5  1.9  1.3  1.4  1.5  1.4  1.5  1.5
FEB  88.3  87.6  95.7  256.3  244.2  369.0  1.6  1.3  1.5  1.3  1.5  1.2  1.4
MAR  81.8  88.2  102.7  264.9  248.2  357.1  1.6  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.3  1.8  1.5
APR  75.4  83.8  113.6  258.7  252.5  359.4  1.8  1.3  1.5  1.5  1.2  1.3  1.4
MAY  74.1  82.9  124.6  258.1  261.4  363.6  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.3  1.3  1.5  1.4
JUN  73.1  83.7  138.3  262.1  276.0  380.6  1.5  1.6  1.6  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.4
JUL  77.0  82.7  170.6  250.5  230.1  331.6  1.5  1.4  1.6  1.7  1.5  1.3  1.5
AUG  78.4  76.0  178.0  240.8  230.4  329.7  1.3  1.3  1.4  1.2  1.2  1.1  1.3
SEP  78.1  77.2  187.5  236.1  243.0  345.8  1.4  1.2  1.5  1.3  1.4  1.2  1.3
OCT  77.8  80.7  193.5  233.1  259.0  364.0  1.5  1.4  1.2  1.6  1.3  1.2  1.4
NOV  79.8  84.5  196.6  239.4  288.2  397.4  1.5  1.6  1.3  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.4
DEC  81.1  83.4  210.9  238.4  330.9  426.9  1.3  1.5  15  1.6  1.4  1.3  1.4
Yearly average:  1.5  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.4Table 2: continued
Month  Standard  Deviation  Coefficient  of variation  1%_
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  Average
JAN  10.6  6.6  6.1  20.1  16.1  22.5  12.7  7.8  6.5  8.2  6.6  6.2  8.0
FEB  10.7  6.1  7.1  18.2  16.7  16.1  12.2  7.0  7.4  7.1  6.9  4.4  7.5
MAR  9.2  7.0  6.9  15.4  14.0  27.6  11.3  8.0  6.7  5.8  5.6  7.7  7.5
APR  8.8  5.9  9.3  17.7  13.0  18.5  11.6  7.0  8.2  6.9  5.1  5.1  7.3
MAY  7.8  6.9  10.8  15.8  16.5  26.3  10.6  8.3  8.6  6.1  6.3  7.2  7.9
JUN  7.9  7.3  11.9  16.2  19.0  26.9  10.8  8.7  8.6  6.2  6.9  7.1  8.0
JUL  5.7  5.9  13.7  19.2  25.7  21.2  7.5  7.2  8.1  7.7  11.2  6.4  8.0
AUG  3.1  4.6  9.9  10.5  11.2  8.3  4.0  6.1  5.6  4.4  4.9  2.5  4.6
SEP  4.7  3.3  12.0  12.9  12.3  13.2  6.0  4.2  6.4  5.5  5.0  3.8  5.2
to  OCT  5.5  5.9  10.1  16.5  13.1  14.3  7.1  7.4  5.2  7.1  5.0  3.9  6.0
NOV  7.3  6.9  11.7  17.7  18.1  20.1  9.2  8.1  5.9  7.4  6.3  5.1  7.0
DEC  6.1  7.0  15.2  19.3  24.7  24.8  7.5  8.4  7.2  8.1  7.5  5.8  7.4
Yearly  average:  9.2  7.3  7.0  6.7  6.4  5.4  7.0Table 3:  Wheat supply demand balance for Poland in 1989/90 - 94/95
[thousand MT]
Item  1989/90  1990/91  1991/92  1992/93  1993/94  1994/95
Begining  Inventory  904  1788  2098  1097  436  788
Production  8462  9026  9261  7368  8243  7659
Imports  2565  697  200  764  500  760
Total Supply  11931  11511  11559  9229  9179  9207
Domestic Usage  10139  9206  9561  8766  8358  8459
Exports  4  207  900  27  33  10
Ending Inventory  1788  2098  1097  436  788  739
Inventory/Usage  [%]  17.6  22.8  11.5  5.0  9.4  8.7
ARR Intervention  Price [zl/MT]a  - 70.0  82.0  175.0  240.0  250.0
Market Price in August [zl]  - 78.4  76.0  178.0  240.8  230.4
Intervention/Market  Price  - 0.89  1.08  0.98  0.99  1.08
Procurments  [thousands  MT]'  - 2256.5  2315.3  2107.4  2114.2  2046.2
ARR Purchases [thousands  MT]c  - 180  650  295  495  1073
ARR Market  Ratio [%]  - 8.0  28.1  14.0  23.4  52.4
Source: GUS, ARR, IERiG
J - intervetion  price is the minimum  price plus a percentage  applied  by ARR.
b _  procurements  for 1990/91  and 1991/92  were estimated  based  on production  and normal
procurements  percentage.
c - based an data contained  in Wei A., Market efficiency  in the Polish markets  for wheat and
other  grains, World Bank  draft report, December,  1995.
26Table 4: Correlation of US dollar term wheat prices in Poland regressed against
respective US dollar term CBOT and LIFFE  nearby futures prices
R' coefficients  of Polish  prices
Time Period  US dollar  terms  Deseasonalized  US  First  differences  of US
against:  dollar tern against:  dollar  term  against:
CBOT  I  LIFFE  CBOT  LIFFE  CBOT  LIFFE
Calendar  Years:
1990-95  0.17  0.01  (-)  0.02 (-)  0.03  0.01  (-)  0.12
1990  0.09  na  0.01  na  0.01  (-)  na
1991  0.30  (-)  na  0.58  na  0.02  na
1992  0.54  (-)  0.44  (-)  0.91 (-)  0.62 (-)  0.03  (-)  0.01
1993  0.00  0.89  0.28  0.86  0.00  (-)  0.12
1994  0.07  0.05  0.01  0.07  0.01  0.05
1995  0.02  0.34  0.16  0.35  0.09  (-)  0.44
Production  Years:
1990/91-94/95  0.09  0.01 (-)  0.06 (-)  0.04  0.02  (-)  0.01
1990/91  0.19(-)  na  0.01(-)  na  0.05(-)  na
1991/92  0.00  (-)  0.16  0.28 (-)  0.04 (-)  0.07  (-)  0.08  (-)
1992/93  0.00 (-)  0.03  0.54 (-)  0.43  (-)  0.00  (-)  0.27
1993/94  0.19  (-)  0.00  0.34 (-)  0.36  0.00  (-)  0.22
1994/95  0.00(-)  0.50  0.11 (-)  0.17  0.16(-)  0.27
Note:  a)  (-) represents  a negative  relationship
b)  calculations  for LIFFE  refer  to period of August 1991  through  December  1995
27Table 5: Correlation of lagged US dollar term wheat prices in Poland regressed
against respective US dollar term CBOT futures prices
Time Period  R' coefficients  of Polish  prices  lagged  by:
1-month  2-month  3-month  4-month  5-month  6-month
Calendar Years:
1990-95  0.19  0.21  0.25  0.29  0.31  0.31
1990  0.00 (-)  0.40 (-)  0.77 (-)  0.87  0.55  (-)  0.04 (-)
1991  0.07 (-)  0.01 (-)  0.01 (-)  0.31  0.60  0.74
1992  0.61 (-)  0.58 (-)  0.51  0.50 (-)  0.52 (-)  0.56 (-)
1993  0.05  0.15  0.26  0.38  0.44  0.61
1994  0.31  0.52  0.68  0.66  0.35  0.11
1995  0.03  0.12  0.28  0.59  0.78  0.28
Production Years:
1990/91-94/95  0.13  0.19  0.28  0.38  0.45  0.46
1990/91  0.51 (-)  0.71 (-)  0.59 (-)  0.26 (-)  0.04 (-)  0.03
1991/92  0.01 (-)  0.01 (-)  0.00  0.02  0.10  0.20
1992/93  0.14  0.58  0.79 (-)  0.73  0.40  '.23
1993/94  0.03 (-)  0.00  0.05 (-)  0.09  0.00  0.13
1994/95  0.02(-)  0.01 (-)  0.04  0.50  0.62  0.18
Note:  (-) represents a negative relationship
28Table 6:  Correlation of lagged US dollar term wheat prices in Poland
regressed against respective US dollar term LIFFE futures prices
Time Period  2R  Coefficients for the Prices Lagged by:  l
1-month  2-month  3-month  4-month  5-month  6-month
Calendar Years:
1991-95  0.00 (-)  0.00 (-)  0.00 (-)  0.00  0.00  0.01
1990  na  na  na  na  na  na
1991  na  na  na  na  na  na
1992  0.35 (-)  0.40 (-)  0.51 (-)  0.60 (-)  0.61 (-)  0.53 (-)
1993  0.93  0.86  0.71  0.53  0.37  0.19
1994  0.08  0.05  0.03  0.05  0.16  0.37
1995  0.07  0.10 (-)  0.42 (-)  0.21 (-)  0.05  0.92
Production Years:
1990/91-94/95  0.00 (-)  0.00 (-)  0.00 (-)  0.00  0.00  0.01
1990/91  na  na  na  na  na  na
1991/92  0.17  0.16  0.16  0.21  0.28  0.41
1992/93  0.21  0.24  0.16  0.13  0.12  0.11
1993/94  0.00  0.12 (-)  0.49 (-)  0.26 (-)  0.01  0.21
1994/95  0.24  0.05  0.00 (-)  0.02 (-)  0.03  0.24
Note:  a)  (-) represents a negative relationship
b)  calculations for LIFFE refer to period of August 1991 through December 1995
29Table 7:  Variation measures of wheat basis in Poland using CBOT futures
calculated in US dollar terms
VariationMeasures
Time Period  Min  Max  Spread  Average  Standard
Max-Min  Deviation
Calendar Years:
1990-95  -76.03  46.98  123.01  -16.20  28.38
1990  -57.78  -9.56  48.22  -34.09  17.00
1991  -67.34  -1.34  66.00  -32.66  21.28
1992  -76.03  16.32  92.35  -25.33  33.31
1993  -21.95  46.98  68.93  17.01  20.74
1994  -38.41  1.41  39.82  -17.95  12.06
1995  -35.58  21.06  56.64  -4.16  21.90
Production Years:
1990/91-94/95  -76.03  46.98  123.01  -11.78  28.54
1990/91  -31.57  -1.33  30.24  -16.32  9.23
1991/92  -76.03  1.81  77.84  -50.72  20.38
1992/93  -6.42  46.98  53.40  20.86  15.67
1993/94  -27.25  46.98  74.23  5.47  21.16
1994/95  -38.41  21.06  59.47  -4.06  22.47
30Table 8:  Variation measures of wheat basis in Poland using LIFFE futures
calculated in US dollar terms
VariationMeasures
Time Period  Min  Max  Spread  Average  Standard
Max-Min  Deviation
Calendar Years:
1991-95  -153.21  -19.63  133.58  -65.39  39.38
1990  na  na  na  na  na
1991  na  na  na  na  na
1992  -144.46  -69.75  74.71  -107.11  29.72
1993  -65.86  -20.15  45.71  -41.92  14.39
1994  -64.53  -30.74  33.79  49.05  10.74
1995  -46.62  -19.63  26.98  -34.57  8.88
Production Years:
1990/91-94/95  -153.21  -19.63  133.57  -68.53  40.03
1990/91  na  na  na  na  na
1991/92  -153.21  -89.13  64.07  -131.55  15.36
1992/93  -87.84  -20.15  67.70  -60.54  17.76
1993/94  -58.74  -20.15  38.59  47.65  15.28
1994/95  -64.53  -19.63  44.89  -41.34  44.89
Note:  calculations for LIFFE refer to period of August 1991 through December 1995
31Table 9:  Variation  measures  of the average  monthly Polish zloty and US dollar
exchange rates
VariationMeasures
Time Period  Min  Max  Spread  Average  Standard  Coefficient of
Max-Min  Deviation  Variation [%]
Calendar Years:
1991-95  0.95  2.51  1.56  1.65  0.58  35.0
1990  0.95  0.95  0.00  0.95  0.00  0.0
1991  0.95  1.15  0.20  1.06  0.08  7.6
1992  1.12  1.54  0.42  1.36  0.11  8.3
1993  1.59  2.11  0.52  1.81  0.18  9.7
1994  2.16  2.43  0.27  2.27  0.07  3.2
1995  2.34  2.51  0.17  2.42  0.05  1.9
Production Years:
1990/91-94/95  0.95  2.44  1.49  1.66  0.54  32.2
1990/91  0.95  1.15  0.20  0.99  0.07  7.3
1991/92  1.11  1.37  0.26  1.22  0.12  9.5
1992/93  1.36  1.80  0.44  1.58  0.13  8.4
1993/94  1.85  2.26  0.41  2.13  0.13  5.9
1994/95  2.29  2.44  0.16  2.37  0.05  2.1
32Table 10: Monthly  average US EEP wheat subsidies I$/MT]
Month  1989/90  1990/91  1991/92  1992/93  1993/94  1994/95
JUN  6.35  15.79  38.05  33.27  19.99  43.08
JUL  3.57  11.34  50.75  20.35  42.44  42.18
AUG  7.45  21.93  53.12  20.11  41.98  36.39
SEP  8.81  44.42  52.45  32.53  50.36  37.60
OCT  10.34  42.71  58.84  33.23  52.65  26.82
NOV  7.18  35.52  52.98  41.03  53.44  22.44
DEC  16.40  43.06  52.13  36.84  51.82  18.65
JAN  17.76  44.45  51.58  33.26  59.01  15.25
FEB  13.15  41.42  47.13  27.95  40.72  9.91
MAR  10.12  39.58  40.38  22.63  52.30  15.20
APR  27.99  34.25  32.26  27.02  46.50  20.52
MAY  14.99  38.27  17.68  20.18  47.40  22.15
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